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Abstract
Crowdfunding has emerged as an alternative means of financing new ventures by utilizing the financial support of a large group of
individual investors. This research asks a novel question: Does being crowdfunded carry any signal value for the broader market of
observing consumers? Seven studies reveal a consumer preference for crowdfunded products, even after controlling for a
product’s objective product characteristics. The authors identify two inferences that help explain this effect: (1) consumers
perceive crowdfunded products to be of higher quality, and (2) they believe that supporting crowdfunding reduces inequality in
the marketplace. The authors further document an important boundary condition of the first inference: the identified effect
reverses in high-risk domains (e.g., products that involve high physical risk) due to consumer perceptions that the crowdfunding
model lacks sufficient professionalism to mitigate risk. With regard to the second inference, the authors find that the positive
crowdfunding effect is particularly strong among consumers who value social equality. Taken together, this work sheds new light
on consumer perceptions of crowdfunding, elucidates why and when consumers prefer crowdfunded products, and offers
actionable implications for managers.
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Crowdfunding is increasingly used as an alternative means of
financing new ventures. Instead of asking venture capitalists,
banks, or other professional financial service providers to
invest in an idea, crowdfunding enables people to pitch ideas
directly to the general public, that is, the potential customers of
the prospective new product (Belleflamme, Lambert, and
Schwienbacher 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018; Mollick
2014). This crowdfunding audience seems willing to invest: at
Kickstarter, one of the leading crowdfunding platforms, over
18 million individuals have helped finance more than 190,000
projects since its launch in 2009 (Kickstarter 2020). More gen-
erally, crowdfunding platforms across the globe raised more
than US$30 billion in 2015 (Zvilichovsky, Danziger, and Stein-
hart 2018), a figure the World Bank estimates will triple by
2025 (The World Bank 2013). The rise of crowdfunding ven-
tures has sparked strong scholarly interest across disciplines
such as finance, entrepreneurship, strategy, and marketing.
Much recent attention has been dedicated to better understand-
ing consumer motivation for participating in crowdfunding
(e.g., Boudreau et al. 2015; Gerber, Hui, and Kuo 2012; Kup-
puswamy and Bayus 2017; Ordanini et al. 2011; Zvilichovsky,
Danziger, and Steinhart 2018) as well as the dynamics and
success factors of the crowdfunding process (e.g., Agrawal,
Catalini, and Goldfarb 2015; Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal
2013; Greenberg and Mollick 2017; Kim et al. 2020; Mollick
2014).
In this article, we build on the initial research and address
the novel question of how crowdfunding is interpreted by the
broader consumer market. Specifically, we ask whether non-
involved consumers—that is, the entire market of a firm’s
potential customers—differentially react to products as a func-
tion of the underlying venture-funding history of said product.
Indeed, given the success of crowdfunding as a mechanism in
bringing products to market, consumers can now choose
between products that were financed via traditional means or
crowdfunding. Herein lies the central research question of this
work: Is there value for the firm in signaling and communicat-
ing the source of a product’s financing to consumers? Will
consumers react more favorably to crowdfunded products? If
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so, what are the psychological reasons underlying the effect,
and what are the related boundaries?
We report the results of seven studies that define our con-
tribution. First, we clarify the signal that crowdfunding pro-
vides to the broader consumer market by demonstrating that
being crowdfunded can help differentiate products, ultimately
increasing demand for such products in the marketplace.
Importantly, this effect materializes even after controlling for
a product’s objective product characteristics. Second, we find
that consumer preference for crowdfunded products can be
understood through a dual-process account entailing positive
inferences about (1) the quality of crowdfunded products and
(2) the ability of crowdfunding to dispel inequality in the mar-
ketplace. Importantly, both inferences motivate consumers to
respond positively to the crowdfunding signal. Third, we iden-
tify perceived risk associated with the underlying product as a
theoretically and managerially relevant boundary condition of
our focal effect. Specifically, we identify a reversal of the
positive crowdfunding effect that turns negative in high-risk
domains (e.g., products involving high physical risk). In this
context, a reversal occurs because consumers view crowd-
funded products as lower quality (rather than higher quality).
Fourth, in support of our process account, we find that the
positive crowdfunding effect operating via the inequality
account is particularly strong among consumers who are fun-
damentally against social inequality or are experimentally
primed to be so.
From a substantive viewpoint, our findings highlight the
conditions under which start-ups and retailers alike might use
“crowdfunded” as a differentiating attribute at the point of sale.
Because it is currently rare to see crowdfunded labeling in the
marketplace (an exception is Amazon’s Kickstarter category,
which groups and explicitly markets all crowdfunded products
as such to the general public), we believe this finding provides
a disruptive spark not only for crowdfunding thought but also
for crowdfunding practice. More broadly, our research shows
that financing methods can have important marketing implica-
tions—in the form of increased product demand—which man-
agers should consider when defining their communication
strategies.
Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is defined as “efforts by entrepreneurial indi-
viduals and groups—cultural, social, and for-profit—to fund
their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions
from a relatively large number of individuals using the
internet, without standard financial intermediaries” (Mollick
2014, p. 2). Entrepreneurs can opt to directly pitch their
ideas via the internet to millions of people; in other words,
“anyone who can convince the public he [or she] has good
business ideas can become an entrepreneur, and anyone with
a few dollars to spend can become an investor” (Bradford
2012, p. 10).
The basic idea behind collective financing is not new; it
actually dates back centuries. In the eighteenth century, for
example, before the young poet Alexander Pope became
famous, he struggled to finance the publication of his transla-
tion of Homer’s Iliad. Lacking resources for publication and
support from publishers, Pope turned to his readers to help
publish the first volume, asking for their support in exchange
for a copy. Another example of early crowdfunding occurred in
1885, when the U.S. government lacked resources to fund the
pedestal of the Statue of Liberty. A newspaper campaign
appealed to the public for help, and 160,000 contributors
financed its final establishment with small donations (BBC
2013). The rise of the internet has unleashed crowdfunding’s
full potential, enabling entrepreneurial initiatives to reach a
bigger audience. For instance, in 1996 the British rock band
Marillion faced cancellation of its U.S. tour due to financial
problems; fans of the band contributed $60,000 online to save
the tour. The band then applied the same approach to finance
the release of their next record in 2001, a funding model that
was directional for many artists in the following years (Gibson
2008). Crowdfunding or variants thereof have also been suc-
cessfully applied in politics; for example, in 2012 U.S. presi-
dent Barack Obama collected US$214 million for his campaign
via small donations, which helped ensure his reelection
(Marom 2012). But perhaps the institutions that stand to benefit
most from crowdfunding are entrepreneurs and businesses, as
they are increasingly circumventing conventional sources of
financing. Instead, they are turning to crowdfunding via newly
formed platforms such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo to launch
their projects and/or ventures.
Given the growing prominence of crowdfunding as a viable
funding source for a wide range of business projects, scholars
from diverse disciplines have shown great interest in under-
standing its dynamics. Prior research has predominantly
asked, what drives consumers to support crowdfunding proj-
ects, and what are the antecedents of financial success in
crowdfunding platforms? For example, Zvilichovsky, Dan-
zinger, and Steinhart (2018) demonstrated experimentally that
crowdfunding participants are motivated by “making the
product happen,” particularly if a similar product would be
otherwise unavailable on the market. In a similar vein, Dai
and Zhang (2019) documented field evidence for consumers’
prosocial motives in helping creators reach their funding
goals on the Kickstarter platform. A stream of recent research
also suggests that crowdfunding might have benefits beyond
simply financing the venture. Specifically, firms can use
crowdfunding to collect early consumer feedback on their
product ideas, promote and distribute their products, or build
relationships with their initial customers (Bitterl and Schreier
2018; Brown, Boon, and Pitt 2017). All of this prior research,
to our knowledge, has focused on participating consumers
(i.e., consumers who are funding or participating in project
achievement). In this article, we take a different perspective
and focus on how observing, nonparticipating consumers
view crowdfunded products. That is, we examine whether the
broader consumer market responds differently when a product
is the outcome of crowdfunding.
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Consumer Reactions to Crowdfunded
Products
The Positive Crowdfunding Effect
In short, we predict that consumers will demonstrate a greater
preference for crowdfunded products versus products that have
been funded differently (such as by corporate, venture capital,
or self-financing) or that do not mention any funding source.
Importantly, we make this prediction even after controlling for
a product’s objective characteristics. In other words, we main-
tain that consumers will demonstrate a greater demand for the
same product if they learn that it has been funded by the crowd.
We build this prediction on a dual-process account that entails
positive inferences about (1) the quality of crowdfunded prod-
ucts and (2) the ability of crowdfunding to drive out inequality
in the marketplace.
Inferences of product quality. First, we predict that consumers
will demonstrate a greater preference for crowdfunded prod-
ucts because of higher product quality associations.1 Indeed,
there are several indications that the “crowdfunded” label
might entail positive signaling for product quality. The many
successful project outcomes (and the fact that crowdfunding
platforms are flourishing) point to the efficacy of this funding
model. For example, a study on the longer-term implications of
crowdfunding discovered that over 90% of successful Kickstar-
ter projects survived their first year after funding, with a third
of them generating revenues of more than $100,000 per year
(Mollick and Kuppuswamy 2014). Further, it appears that even
professionals interpret “crowdfunded” as an indicator of qual-
ity. Specifically, Sorenson et al. (2016) showed that venture
capital follows crowdfunding; crowdfunding activities in a spe-
cific geographic area (i.e., Kickstarter money going to start-ups
in a certain region) effected a positive subsequent change in
venture capital funding in that same area.
Important to our conceptualization, we contend that
revealed information regarding other consumers’ investments
in a crowdfunded project might be viewed by observing con-
sumers as a strong signal in and of itself. Prior economics
research has highlighted the value of such a signal; when indi-
viduals make decisions with imperfect information, they often
follow others’ beliefs, decisions and behaviors, a phenomenon
also referred to as “herding behavior” (Banerjee 1992),
“bandwagon effects” (Leibenstein 1950), or “information
cascades” (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992).
Indeed, numerous studies have found that consumers often
associate the popularity of a product with better value and
quality and in turn show greater demand for that product
(e.g., Caminal and Vives 1996; Herpen, Pieters, and Zeelen-
berg 2009). For example, simply presenting a dish as one of the
five most popular dishes on a restaurant menu is found to
increase demand for that dish by up to 20% (Cai and Chen
2009). Though not necessarily consumers of the crowdfunded
product themselves, we contend that consumer “investors” who
support crowdfunded projects send a parallel signal to obser-
ving consumers (i.e., an indication of social proof), leading to
bandwagon and herding effects for the potential purchase of the
crowdfunded product.
To corroborate our theoretical account and obtain fine-
grained insights into the inferences made by consumers due
to the crowdfunding signal, we conducted a qualitative study
using in-depth interviews with 28 respondents (for more
details, see the Web Appendix). These interviews supported
the role of a social proof heuristic in determining consumers’
inferences about crowdfunded products. Specifically, we found
support for our predicted inference: if many people (i.e., the
crowd) invest in a product, it “must be good.” One informant,
for example, indicated, “I would say that [the crowdfunded
products are better], and I trust the crowd and the opinion of
many and I would believe that the product would be better if
100 consumers say ‘I would invest in it’!” (Interview #23).
Thus, consumers seem to associate crowdfunded products with
better product quality because they “trust the crowd and the
opinion of many” (Interview #23). Importantly, these positive
quality inferences specifically emerged when informants
identified product domains where they believed the crowd
(i.e., nonprofessional investors) could judge the quality of the
product.
We further posit that consumers may have greater trust in
the quality of crowdfunded products because they view other
consumers investing their own money into a product as a
“costly signal” (Smith and Bird 2005). This signal is different
from “cheap talk” signals, where people are merely spreading
positive word of mouth about a product (Spence 1974). This
costliness argument also emerged in our interviews, along with
the lay belief that crowdfunded products better address specific
consumer needs (i.e., “what consumers really need”) because
the consumers themselves, rather than a company or financial
investors, decide which products are financed. Finally, consu-
mers ostensibly infer that successfully crowdfunded start-ups
must be dedicated to their products and “really passionate
about what they are doing” (Interview #3), otherwise consumer
investors would not invest their money in these underdog firms
(Paharia, Avery, and Keinan 2014). Drawing on these consid-
erations, we predict that consumers will associate crowdfunded
products with higher quality, which in turn should spur a
greater preference for crowdfunded products.
Inferences of equality of opportunity in the marketplace. Second, we
predict that beyond any product-related beliefs, consumers will
demonstrate a greater preference for crowdfunded products
because they believe that supporting crowdfunding reduces
inequality in the marketplace. This idea is consistent with the
view of Mollick (2016), who argues that crowdfunding
“transforms the opaque and oligarchical market for early-stage
fundraising into a more democratic, open one.” Likewise, Mol-
lick and Robb (2016, p. 86) postulate that crowdfunding can be
viewed as “the democratization of innovation, entrepreneurship,
1 This prediction refers to “regular” products that are not associated with high
levels of risk. For higher-risk domains, see our moderation hypothesis (H3).
646 Journal of Marketing Research 58(4)
and entrepreneurial finance,” and that by “giving a voice to
people who would otherwise never even have a chance to seek
funding, let alone provide it, crowdfunding creates opportunities
for new businesses and innovations, as well as a new wave of
investors.” Beyond this conjecture, crowdfunding has been
empirically shown to be capable of providing capital to entre-
preneurs in more places, including places with little previous
access to venture capital funding (Sorenson et al. 2016). More-
over, recent findings by Greenberg and Mollick (2017) show that
women, who have traditionally had less access to venture fund-
ing than men, are more likely to be supported in crowdfunding
campaigns.
We wanted to augment this formative support for our think-
ing by utilizing the qualitative interviews to ascertain the fol-
lowing: Are consumers specifically concerned about unequal
opportunities in the marketplace (e.g., some firms do not have
the opportunity to grow and sustain their business), and impor-
tantly, is crowdfunding viewed as a means of equal opportunity
in this regard? Our interviews indeed show that consumers see
inequality in the marketplace. Consumers find the ideology
behind crowdfunding appealing because crowdfunding enables
firms to enter the market without relying on traditional finan-
cial means.2 This point is illustrated by the following quote
(Interview #2):
But certainly, the chances are not equal for everyone. If I as a
hobbyist, as a normal working guy, somehow develop a product
at my garage at home, then [getting financed by] the bank is
already quite difficult. They will not be excited that I want money
for some cool new stool in my garage! [laughs] That is certainly
quite difficult. Such products are not interesting to investors in
most of the cases. That means you can certainly apply there, but
it is highly improbable. The door is more or less closed. And for
such people, not all doors are open, or at least some doors are more
closed than others. And the crowdfunding door, so to speak, is
initially open to anyone.
Our interviews further indicate that consumers perceive
crowdfunded firms to be smaller and financially weaker than
those funded by venture capitalists; as a result, consumers con-
sider the former type of firms to be relatively disadvantaged in
terms of their “power,” “influence,” or “financial resources.”
Several informants expressed a related sense of caring and
demonstrated a desire to equalize the playing field for the
crowdfunded product’s creator. Here, some of our narratives
were consistent with the finding that consumers often prefer
products from firms that are perceived as underdogs—that is,
smaller, disadvantaged firms that battle with their “heart”
against large firms (Kirmani et al. 2017; Paharia, Avery, and
Keinan 2014; Thompson, Rindfleisch, and Arsel 2005). For
example, when one informant was asked whether he would
rather choose a backpack from a firm that relies on crowdfund-
ing or one that relies on traditional forms of financing (e.g.,
venture capital), he said that he would “go for the crowdfunded
backpack just to support the little ones” (Interview #18).
Notably, the notion of inequality reduction refers to the
opportunity to have equality rather than to the outcome of
equality itself. The main logic is that everyone should be given
the same opportunity, but not everyone should be equal (and
thus not everyone will have the same capabilities; see also
Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). The playing field for these
opportunities is the marketplace. This nuance was explicitly
acknowledged in our interviews as exemplified by one of the
respondents who considers crowdfunding “a new way of hav-
ing opportunities of funding to people with good ideas that
cannot access the traditional methods” (Interview #3).
It is important to note that our qualitative findings pointed to
both the equality of opportunity and resources provided
through crowdfunding. However, the focus of discussion pri-
marily centered on opportunity for the crowdfunded product (in
the marketplace). The identification of resources here seemed
to underlie opportunity, but was not focal as the central infer-
ence in the equality discussion. As such, our conceptualization
and empirical work examines crowdfunding as a means to
establish equal opportunity for products in the marketplace
(and reducing marketplace inequality as a result). In summary,
we predict that inferences of equal opportunity in the market-
place are a secondary motivation underlying a positive crowd-
funding effect on consumer preferences. Our theorizing thus
yields the following two hypotheses:
H1: Consumers demonstrate a greater preference for
products that have been crowdfunded versus products
that have been funded by corporate, venture capital,
or self-funding (or products that do not mention any
funding source).
H2: The positive effect of crowdfunding on consumer
product preference is mediated by (a) inferences of
product quality and (b) inferences of equal opportunity
in the marketplace.
High-Risk Domains as a Boundary Condition
Although we believe that the positive crowdfunding effect can
be observed in different situations and domains, we do not
deem it to be universal. We predict that a central boundary
condition to consider is the risk consumers associate with the
underlying product. In particular, we predict that in high-
product-risk situations, the positive crowdfunding effect might
reverse. Marketing scholars often define perceived risk in terms
of both perceived likelihood and severity of potential negative
consequences associated with product purchase, use, and con-
sumption (Cunningham 1967; Dowling and Staelin 1994).
2 Our interviews further suggest that consumers consider this inequality to be
what economists refer to as “unjustified equality,” where equal opportunities
are not offered and outcomes are not determined by effort but by extraneous
factors (Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Their narratives are also consistent with
prior research suggesting that most people exhibit egalitarian motives and a
general preference for reducing inequality (e.g., Blake et al. 2015; Dawes et al.
2007) as well as with evidence indicating that a desire for equality is deeply
rooted in the evolutionary path of humankind (for reviews, see Aoki,
Yomogida, and Matsumoto [2015] and Rilling and Sanfey [2011]).
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Prior research has established perceived risk as a key factor in
determining consumer behavior (e.g., Bettman 1973; Cox and
Rich 1964; Erdem, Zhao, and Valenzuela 2004). One important
way in which risk affects consumers is that it modifies consu-
mers’ information processing when forming attitudes about
products and making purchase decisions (Dowling and Staelin
1994; Gürhan-Canli and Batra 2004; Petersen and Kumar
2015). For example, when consumers perceive high product
risk, they tend to evaluate alternatives more carefully (Dowling
and Staelin 1994); accordingly, they might be also more cau-
tious when evaluating products that are crowdfunded.
We expect that high-product-risk situations will raise ques-
tions about the integrity of the crowdfunding model, with
resulting negative consequences for consumers’ interest in
crowdfunded products. That is, when making purchase deci-
sions for high-risk products, the potential shortcomings of a
crowd of individual amateur investors in picking and financing
the “right” project (compared with professionals such as ven-
ture capitalists or bank loan officers) is likely to become more
salient. In high-product-risk purchase domains, where the role
of expertise is often paramount, consumers may believe that a
crowd of amateur investors lack the required abilities to ade-
quately assess the quality of a product or project.
Likewise, disadvantages attributed to the crowdfunded
firms (e.g., in terms of their limited size and resources) might
further prompt consumers to question the firms’ ability to
undertake a robust new product development process. Put dif-
ferently, the underdog status of crowdfunded firms (discussed
previously as a potential advantage) might turn into a disad-
vantage for high-risk domains. This line of reasoning aligns
with narratives obtained in our qualitative study. Several of our
informants associated crowdfunded products with lower prod-
uct quality. This typically occurred when informants referred to
product domains where purchases were associated with high
levels of risk, such as medical products (Interview #25). In such
high-risk contexts, respondents associated crowdfunding with
less professionalism and expertise in product development. For
example, reduced planning, preparation, and product testing
are believed to make such products more vulnerable to failure,
which seems particularly troublesome for high-risk situations
(Interviews #23 and #24). Our theorizing is also consistent with
research documenting consumer preference for established and
familiar options when making decisions under uncertain and
stressful circumstances, because such options signal safety
(e.g., De Vries et al. 2010; Litt et al. 2011; Muthukrishnan,
Wathieu, and Xu 2009).
Taken together, we theorize that in high-risk domains, con-
sumer preference for crowdfunded products will be reversed. In
this context, consumers are likely to perceive crowdfunded
products as lower quality. Indeed, we argue that the positive
quality inference predicted for more regular, lower-risk product
domains reverses in high-risk product domains, because obser-
ving consumers value professional experts (vs. “more main-
stream consumers”) more highly when judging the quality of
the product or project. Thus,
H3: The positive effect of crowdfunding on consumer
product preference (H1) is moderated by perceived
risk, such that the preference for crowdfunded products
is reversed when consumers associate the product with
high risk.
Overview of Studies
We test our predictions across seven studies. In Study 1, we
validate the hypothesis that consumers prefer crowdfunded
products (H1). Study 1a examines whether consumers prefer
a product that is described as crowdfunded compared with a
baseline condition that does not mention funding source
details. We do this by using an incentive-compatible
willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure as the dependent variable
and digital notebooks as the product category. Adopting a con-
sequential behavioral-choice design paradigm and using the
context of backpacks, Study 1b tests whether consumers prefer
crowdfunded products over products portrayed as funded by
venture capital. Study 1c replicates the results in another prod-
uct category (cameras) using a relative preference measure as
the dependent variable and against a series of different control
conditions (i.e., bank loan and self-financing). In particular,
this study shows that the identified effect is specific to crowd-
funding and not other funding source information. Study 2 tests
our proposed quality and inequality accounts, postulated to
underlie the focal crowdfunding effect (H2a and H2b), by mea-
suring both mediators. Study 3 shows that perceived risk serves
as a boundary condition for our focal crowdfunding effect (H3).
Studies 4a and 4b further validate our inequality account by
measuring and manipulating consumers’ general attitude
toward inequality (H2b).
Study 1: Consumers Prefer Crowdfunded
Products
Study 1 tests H1 using different experimental designs, depen-
dent variables, product contexts, and samples. While Study 1a
maximizes the ecological validity of the manipulations, the
goal of Studies 1b and 1c, respectively, is to provide a test
setting characterized by high levels of internal validity.
Study 1a
Method. Participants were 1,512 consumers (Mage ¼ 31 years;
44% female; Prolific).3 Before starting, participants were
informed about the incentive compatible nature of the experi-
ment and the purpose of the study, which was to learn about
their interest in a digital notebook. Participants were then
assigned to one of two experimental conditions (crowdfunding
vs. baseline). In both conditions, they were presented with a
3 We determined the sample size a priori based on our experience with this type
of dependent variable from other projects and based on a small-scale pretest of
this study (in estimating the desired sample size, we used power of .80, p< .01,
and a safety buffer to maximize the chances to detect a true effect).
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screenshot of a shopping website homepage featuring three
products, including the focal product of a digital notebook. In
the crowdfunding condition, we discreetly implemented our
manipulation with a statement about crowdfunding in the text
above the product (for details, see the Web Appendix). In the
baseline condition, there was no respective funding informa-
tion present. To maximize external validity, we took the crowd-
funding signal from a real shopping website (thegrommet.com)
that sells, among other things, crowdfunded products (includ-
ing the ones shown to our study participants). Mimicking a real
shopping experience, participants were then directed to the
next page and presented with more information about the digi-
tal notebook (the crowdfunding signal in the treatment condi-
tion remained on this next page). In particular, participants
were shown a color picture of a digital notebook, together with
product-related information. In both conditions we included the
actual product rating for the notebook (4.1 out of 5 Grommets,
based on 299 reviews). In summary, our stimuli closely
resembled the website’s design and content, with the goal of
providing high levels of external validity.
The dependent variable was participants’ WTP for the digital
notebook, which was elicited directly after product exposure.
We employed a variant of the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
(1964) procedure—an incentive-compatible value elicitation
method, and a valid and reliable indicator of one’s true WTP
(e.g., Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). Specifically, we used a
two-staged measure: participants were first asked whether they
were at all interested in making a bid for the product, and if so,
they were asked to make their binding bid using a slider scale in
US$1 increments (US$1–US$20; participants who had no inter-
est in the product were transferred to the next survey question
and their WTP coded as zero). At the beginning of the study,
participants were informed that their decisions would be binding
if they were one of three lottery winners for US$20. They were
also informed that if they had the winning bid and it was greater
than or equal to a randomly drawn price, they would receive the
product at that random price and any leftover money (i.e., US$20
minus price). However, if the bid was smaller than the random
price, they would not receive the digital notebook but would
collect the full lottery amount instead (US$20). Next, on a sep-
arate page, all participants were asked to answer an attention
check question: “To what extent do you think the statement ‘this
product was crowdfunded’ is true?” (1 ¼ “very false,” and 7 ¼
“very true”). In support of our manipulations, we found that
participants in the treatment condition more strongly agreed with
that statement (Mcrowdfunding¼ 5.97, Mbaseline¼ 4.15; F(1, 1,510)
¼ 530.79, p < .001, d ¼ 1.18).
Results and discussion. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
WTP as the dependent variable and funding source as the inde-
pendent variable (crowdfunding vs. baseline) provided strong
support for the predicted positive crowdfunding effect (H1).
Participants were willing to pay about 21% more when the
product was described as crowdfunded compared with when no
funding source information was present (Mcrowdfunding ¼ 8.57,
Mbaseline¼ 7.11; F(1, 1,510)¼ 14.81, p< .001, d¼ .20). Means
and standard deviations for Study 1a and other studies are
reported in the Web Appendix.
Three additional analyses provide support for the robustness
of these results. First, we conducted a negative binomial regres-
sion analysis to account for a large number of zero values in our
dependent variable (i.e., 36% of participants made a bid of zero),
which returned substantively identical results and strong support
for a positive crowdfunding effect (Wald w2 ¼ 11.59, b ¼ .19,
SE ¼ .055 p < .001). Second, we used one’s likelihood of
making a bid (i.e., whether or not participants wanted to make
a bid at all) as the dependent variable. Results of a logistic
regression analysis show that consumers were more likely to bid
for the notebook when it was described as crowdfunded com-
pared with when no funding source information was present
(68% vs. 61%; w2 ¼ 8.14, b ¼ .31, SE ¼ .11, p ¼ .004). Third,
we reran our main analysis for the subsample of participants who
decided to make a bid (N¼ 971); results again are supportive of
H1 (Mcrowdfunding ¼ 12.64, Mbaseline ¼ 11.71; F(1, 969) ¼ 6.70,
p ¼ .01, d ¼ .17) (for details, see the Web Appendix).
Using an incentive-compatible WTP elicitation method, Study
1a shows that consumers are willing to pay significantly more for
the same product when it is described as crowdfunded. Figure 1
illustrates that the effect is not caused by a few outliers, but instead
materializes across the entire WTP distribution. In a follow-up
study, we conceptually replicated the focal effect using a more
classic dependent variable (i.e., purchase intent) while keeping
price constant (for details, see the Web Appendix).
Study 1b
Following the recommendations of Meyvis and Van Osselaer
(2018), Studies 1b and 1c employed a direct comparison
design. That is, participants were presented with two different
products side by side, the only difference between conditions
being the information regarding our independent variable—the
funding source of the product. This design is recommended for
increasing statistical power.
Method. Participants were 390 students who participated in a
lab study in exchange for course credit (Mage ¼ 20.44 years;
51% female). Before starting, participants learned that they
would have the chance to actually win the pro backpack of
their choice during the study. Participants were introduced to
two start-ups labeled Start-up A and Start-up B and informed
that the real brand names were blinded. They were also
informed that both start-ups recently raised comparable
amounts of funding to launch their backpacks but differed in
terms of funding source. One start-up was described as crowd-
funded, whereas the other start-up was funded by venture cap-
ital. Half the participants were assigned to a condition in which
Start-up A’s backpack was described as crowdfunded and
Start-up B’s backpack as venture capital funded; the other half
were assigned to a condition in which Start-up A’s backpack
was described as venture capital funded and Start-up B’s back-
pack as crowdfunded. Next, participants were shown color
pictures of two different backpacks (taken from the Indiegogo
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crowdfunding platform). The two backpacks differed in terms
of functionality and design as well as size and weight (for
details, see the Web Appendix). Because our experimental
design (product flip) enabled us to effectively control for prod-
uct differences, any difference in terms of the dependent vari-
able is attributable to the focal funding source manipulation.
We captured product choice, our dependent variable, by asking
participants which of the two backpacks they would choose if
they won the lottery. When the study was complete, we ran-
domly determined a winner and sent them the backpack.
Results and discussion. A logistic regression with actual product
choice as the dependent variable and funding source as the
independent variable demonstrates that consumers have a sig-
nificantly stronger preference for the backpack when it
is described as crowdfunded (w2 ¼ 6.47, b ¼ .52, SE ¼ .20,
p ¼ .011). For both backpacks, the choice share for the crowd-
funded alternative was higher than for the venture capital funded
alternative: 54% (backpack A) and 59% (backpack B). Put dif-
ferently, participants were significantly more likely to choose
Start-up B’s backpack when it was described as crowdfunded
than when it was described as venture capital funded (59% vs.
46%); likewise, Start-up A’s backpack was significantly more
likely to be chosen when it was described as crowdfunded than
when it was described as venture capital funded (54% vs. 41%).
Study 1c
In Study 1c, we aimed to replicate the crowdfunding effect in
another product category (cameras) using a relative prefer-
ence measure as the dependent variable and a different study
population (Amazon Mechanical Turk [MTurk]; N ¼ 302);
importantly, we also used a series of different control condi-
tions. In particular, we wanted to assess the possibility that
(negative) attitudes toward venture capitalists might, at least
in part, have driven the effect obtained in Study 1b. We there-
fore included three alternative funding sources: venture cap-
ital, bank loan, or self-financing (between-subjects). The
study again utilized a direct comparison design (i.e., Start-
up A crowdfunded and Start-up B alternative funding source
vs. Start-up A alternative funding source and Start-up B
crowdfunded). Participants indicated their product preference
on a seven-point scale (1 ¼ “I would prefer to purchase the
product from Start-up A,” and 7¼ “I would prefer to purchase
the product from Start-up B”). Findings were affirmative:
participants reported a significantly stronger preference for
Start-up B’s camera when it was described as crowdfunded
(M ¼ 4.42) than when it was described as funded by venture
capital, a bank loan, or self-financing (M ¼ 3.50; F(1, 296) ¼
15.37, p < .001, d ¼ .45). Critically, the 2 (product flip)  3
(alternative funding source) interaction proved insignificant
(p > .20), suggesting that the focal crowdfunding effect
emerges when pitted against all three control conditions (for
details, see the Web Appendix).
Study 1 provides converging evidence in support of H1: pre-
senting a product as “crowdfunded” increases consumer prefer-
ence for that product, ceteris paribus. We obtained this effect
against different control conditions, utilizing different experi-
mental paradigms, dependent variables, and study populations.
After having established the positive crowdfunding effect, we
next turn to testing the underlying processes (H2a and H2b).
Study 2: Testing the Mediators
Study 2 aims to test our dual-process account, contending that
the positive crowdfunding effect is attributable to positive
inferences about (1) the quality of crowdfunded products
(H2a) and (2) the ability of crowdfunding to drive out inequality
in the marketplace (H2b).
Method
Participants were 200 consumers (Mage¼ 39 years; 49% female;
Prolific). They were first asked to imagine that they were look-
ing to purchase a new camera and had narrowed their alterna-
tives to two options. Next, ostensibly using the “compare”
function of a real shopping website (The Grommet), they were
presented two cameras side by side—Luna and MySight—
together with various product-related information that consu-
mers are typically exposed to while shopping (i.e., product pic-
ture, product-related information, product rating, price, and
consumer ratings and reviews; for details, see the Web Appen-
dix). To describe the products’ funding sources, we used a
slightly modified version of an actual crowdfunding cue from
The Grommet: “The people decided, and put their money behind
that decision. The following product was brought to life thanks
to funding received from consumers in a crowdfunding cam-
paign.” The description for venture capitalist funding read as
follows: “The venture capitalists (VCs) decided, and put their
money behind that decision. The following product was brought




















Figure 1. WTP for the digital notebook as a function of whether the
product is crowdfunded or not (Study 1).
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were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. In one
condition the product Luna was described as crowdfunded and
the product MySight as venture capital funded, whereas in the
other condition Luna was described as venture capital funded
and MySight was described as crowdfunded. Everything else—
including consumer ratings and reviews, product price and infor-
mation—was identical between the two conditions.
Purchase intention, our dependent variable, was measured
using a three-item scale (a ¼ .94): (1) “I would be willing to
buy this product,” (2) “I would be likely to purchase this
product,” and (3) I am interested in buying this product” (1
¼ “More true for Luna,” and 7 ¼ “More true for MySight”).
The mediators were captured using three-item scales with the
same anchors; for perceived product quality: (1) “I think this
product is of high quality,” (2) “This product appears to be
good in terms of functionality,” (3) “This product is likely very
useful to consumers” (a ¼ .92); for consumer motivation to
help reduce inequality in the market: (1) “Purchasing this prod-
uct would help reduce inequality in the marketplace,” (2)
“With purchasing this product, I would signal that I value
equality in the market,” and (3) “By purchasing this product,
I would support the idea that every firm should have equal
opportunities to rise up and prosper” (a ¼ .94).4
Results and Discussion
We started our analyses by assessing convergent and discrimi-
nant validity of our dependent and process measures using the
criteria set forth by Fornell and Larcker (1981). For each of the
three constructs, average variance extracted (AVE) was higher
than the traditional cutoff value of .5 (ranging from .67 to .73),
providing evidence for convergent validity of the measures. In
addition, AVEs were greater than the squared correlation
between each pair of constructs (the largest of which was
.45), which confirms that the constructs were empirically dis-
tinct from each other.5
An ANOVA with purchase intention as the dependent vari-
able and funding source as the independent variable again pro-
duced strong support for H1: participants demonstrated a
significantly stronger purchase intention for the MySight camera
when it was described as crowdfunded (M¼ 4.47) as opposed to
venture capital funded (M¼ 3.36; F(1, 198)¼ 30.42, p< .001, d
¼ .78). We obtain a similar pattern of effects for our mediators.
First, participants perceived the quality of MySight as signifi-
cantly higher when it was described as crowdfunded (M¼ 4.31)
as opposed to venture capital funded (M ¼ 3.80; F(1, 198) ¼
6.95, p ¼ .009, d ¼ .38). This effect is particularly notable
because participants in both conditions saw the same product
descriptions and were also exposed to the same explicit con-
sumer ratings and comments. Second, participants felt
significantly more strongly that purchasing MySight would
reduce inequality in the marketplace when it was described as
crowdfunded (M ¼ 4.96) versus venture capital funded (M ¼
2.95; F(1, 198) ¼ 131.64, p < .001, d ¼ 1.62).
To formally test for mediation, we used bootstrapping pro-
cedures (Hayes 2013, Model 4) and tested a model with pur-
chase intention as the dependent variable, funding source as the
independent variable, and perceived product quality and social
inequality as mediators. We find both indirect effects to be
significant, in support of H2a and H2b, respectively (perceived
product quality: 95% confidence interval [CI95%] ¼ [.08, .53];
consumer motivation to help reduce inequality in the market:
CI95% ¼ [.35, 1.16]).
In full support of H2a and H2b, Study 2 shows that inferences
regarding product quality and marketplace inequality are
strong drivers of the positive crowdfunding effect identified.
In a follow-up study (N ¼ 601; Mage ¼ 35 years; 48% female;
Prolific) that experimentally manipulated product quality, we
provide additional evidence of the importance of both product
quality and consumer motivation to help reduce inequality in
driving the crowdfunding effect. Importantly, the inequality
process mechanism (H2b) remains robust even if quality is held
experimentally constant (for details, see the Web Appendix). In
Study 3, we examine the moderating role of risk to better
understand the domains wherein consumer preference for
crowdfunded products is likely to replicate versus not.
Study 3: Risk as a Central Boundary
Condition
In Study 3, we test whether perceived product risk serves as a
central boundary condition for our focal crowdfunding effect.
In particular, we expect that the preference for crowdfunded
products will be reversed when consumers associate the pur-
chase decision with high product risk (H3). Note that we predict
this reversal due to our assertion that high-risk domains will
cause consumers to no longer see crowdfunded products as
high quality (but, rather, low quality).
Method
We recruited 1,003 consumers (Mage ¼ 27 years; 40% female;
Prolific) in a 2 (funding source: Start-up A [Clinge] crowd-
funded and Start-up B [Ropesy] venture capital funded,
or vice versa)  2 (physical product risk: high vs. low)
between-subjects experimental design. Physical product risk was
manipulated by instructing participants to imagine wanting to
purchase a climbing rope (high product risk) versus a battle rope
(low product risk). We considered climbing rope to be a high-
risk product purchase because the product’s failure to work
properly during use (e.g., due to poor product quality or product
malfunction) could have severe consequences for one’s physical
health (injury or even death), whereas such consequences would
be relatively minor in the case of battle rope (battle rope is used
for fitness exercise on the ground).
4 As a control variable, we further captured perceived underdog status
(Kirmani et al. 2017). As detailed in the Web Appendix, our hypothesis tests
(H2a–b) hold after we add perceived underdog status as a third mediator.
5 Perceived product quality is positively correlated with inequality (r ¼ .33, p
< .001); the shared variance of the constructs is 11%.
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Mimicking the “compare” function of real shopping websites,
two ropes were presented side by side—Clinge and Ropesy—
together with product-related information (e.g., picture, info,
price, consumer ratings; see the Web Appendix for details). Also
contained within this information were details about the funding
source. Specifically, the description of crowdfunding stated,
“The following product was brought to life thanks to funding
received from consumers in a crowdfunding campaign.” The
description for venture capitalist funding read, “The following
product was brought to life thanks to funding from venture
capitalists.” We manipulated the funding source by randomly
assigning participants to one of these two conditions. In one
condition, the product Clinge was described as crowdfunded and
the product Ropesy as venture capital funded, whereas in the
other condition Ropesy was described as crowdfunded and
Clinge was described as venture capital funded.
The dependent variable of the study was purchase intention,
which was measured using the same three items as in Study 2
(a ¼ .94). Also using the same three items from that study, we
measured perceived product quality (a ¼ .89) and consumer
motivation to help reduce inequality (a¼ .91) as mediators. As
a check for the focal physical risk manipulation, participants
completed the following item: “I think the physical risk if
the rope does not work as intended is . . . ” (1 ¼ “very low,”
and 7 ¼ “very high”).
Results and Discussion
We started with several preliminary analyses to assess the validity
of our measures and the effectiveness of our manipulation. First,
we examined convergent and discriminant validity of our pur-
chase intention, perceived quality, and motivation to help reduce
inequality measures using the Fornell and Larcker (1981) criteria.
The AVEs of the constructs were higher than the traditional cutoff
value of .5 (i.e., between .82 and .89), providing evidence for
convergent validity of the measures. Moreover, AVEs were
greater than the squared correlation of constructs (between .00
and .53), confirming discriminant validity.
Second, a 2 (funding source: Start-up A [Clinge] crowd-
funded and Start-up B [Ropesy] venture capital funded, or vice
versa)  2 (physical risk: high vs. low) ANOVA on the manip-
ulation check measure first reveals, as intended, a significant
main effect of risk (F(1, 999) ¼ 505.08, p < .001, d ¼ 1.42):
The climbing rope (Mhigh risk ¼ 5.66) was associated with
significantly higher physical risk than the battle rope
(Mlow risk ¼ 3.27). While the funding source factor was not
significant (F ¼ 2.24, p ¼ .14, d ¼ .09), we also observed a
significant interaction effect (F ¼ 6.24, p ¼ .013). A closer
investigation of this interaction, however, shows a similar pat-
tern of results in both funding source conditions. Specifically,
when Ropesy was described as crowdfunded, participants per-
ceived the high-risk condition (M ¼ 5.61) to be significantly
riskier than the low-risk condition (M¼ 3.48; F(1, 999)¼ 7.60,
p < .001, d ¼ 1.27). Likewise, when Ropesy was described as
venture capital funded, participants perceived a greater level of
risk in the high-risk condition (M ¼ 5.71) than the low-risk
condition (M ¼ 3.05; F(1, 999) ¼ 7.60, p < .001, d ¼ 1.57).
Thus, both contrast effects are strong and significant, but the
latter is somewhat more pronounced. We attribute this unex-
pected effect to the large sample size. Taken together, we con-
cluded that the manipulation worked as intended.
A 2  2 ANOVA on product preference first re-
vealed two significant main effects for the funding source
(MRopesy crowdfunded ¼ 4.15, MRopesy VC funded ¼ 3.89;
F(1, 999) ¼ 11.93, p ¼ .001, d ¼ .15) and the risk manipula-
tions (Mhigh risk ¼ 4.20, Mlow risk ¼ 3.83; F(1, 999) ¼ 21.21,
p < .001, d ¼ .25). Importantly, the analysis also produced the
predicted significant interaction effect (F(1, 999) ¼ 198.03,
p < .001). As expected, we found a positive and significant
crowdfunding effect in the low-physical-risk condition: parti-
cipants demonstrated a significantly stronger purchase inten-
tion for the Ropesy product when it was described as
crowdfunded (M¼ 4.61) compared with when it was described
as venture capital funded (M ¼ 3.03; F(1, 999) ¼ 146.36,
p < .001, d ¼ 1.19). In contrast, this effect fully reversed in
the high-physical-risk condition: purchase intention for the
Ropesy product was significantly lower when it was described
as crowdfunded (M ¼ 3.75) than when it was described
as venture capital funded (M ¼ 4.71; F(1, 999) ¼ 59.30,
p < .001, d ¼ .64) (see Figure 2).
A 2  2 ANOVA on product quality revealed a signi-
ficant main effect of the funding source manipulation
(MRopesy crowdfunded ¼ 4.12, MRopesy VC funded ¼ 3.95; F(1,
999)¼ 7.84, p¼ .005, d¼ .14) and an insignificant main effect
of the risk manipulation (F(1, 999) ¼ .01, p ¼ .92, d ¼ .02). As
anticipated, we also obtained a significant interaction effect
(F(1, 1,001) ¼ 110.96, p < .001). Follow-up contrasts showed
a positive and significant crowdfunding effect in the low-
physical-risk condition: participants attributed significantly
higher product quality to the Ropesy product when it was
described as crowdfunded (M ¼ 4.56) compared with when it
was described as venture capital funded (M¼ 3.54; F(1, 999)¼
84.71, p < .001, d ¼ .85). In contrast, this effect fully reversed
in the high-physical-risk condition: perceived quality of the
Ropesy product was seen as significantly lower when it was
described as crowdfunded (M ¼ 3.74) than when it was
described as venture capital funded (M ¼ 4.33; F(1, 999) ¼
31.46, p < .001, d ¼ .49).
Contrasting this pattern of effects, a 2  2 ANOVA
on equality revealed only a significant main effect of the
funding source manipulation (MRopesy crowdfunded ¼ 4.84,
MRopesy VC funded ¼ 3.01; F(1, 999) ¼ 605.89, p < .001
d ¼ 1.55); the main effect of the risk factor and the interaction
term were insignificant (Fs < 2.48, ps > .115).
To formally test for moderated mediation, we used boot-
strapping procedures (Hayes 2013, Model 8). We tested a
model with purchase intention as the dependent variable, fund-
ing source as the independent variable, perceived product qual-
ity and motivation to help reduce inequality as mediators, and
our risk manipulation as the moderator. The results show sig-
nificant indirect effects of the funding source manipulation on
purchase intention through both perceived product quality and
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motivation to help reduce inequality in the market, across both
risk conditions. However, differences between the conditional
indirect effects were statistically significant for perceived prod-
uct quality (CI95% ¼ [1.56, 1.09]) but not for motivation to
help reduce inequality (CI95% ¼ [.004, .05]). The results
therefore provide evidence for moderated mediation through
perceived product quality.
In summary, Study 3 provides strong evidence in support of
H3: perceived risk regarding the underlying product domain
constitutes a boundary condition of the positive crowdfunding
effect established in Studies 1 and 2. When the product is asso-
ciated with low risk, the positive crowdfunding effect unfolds as
previously documented. However, the effect fully reverses in
cases where the product is associated with high risk: in such
instances, consumers opt against crowdfunded products because
they no longer perceive them to be high quality but instead
regard them as low quality. Interestingly, we find that the
inequality account works independently of risk: supporting a
crowdfunded project in order to (re)establish marketplace equal-
ity seems to be a general aspiration, ceteris paribus. Finally, we
note that a follow-up study (N ¼ 1,001, Mage ¼ 30 years, 47%
female, Prolific) showed that preference reversal in high-risk
contexts is not limited to physical product risk but also gener-
alizes to economic risk (i.e., the risk a consumption situation
poses to one’s personal finances; for example, a defective prod-
uct might impair one’s economic well-being more in case the
consumer investment was higher rather than lower; for details,
see the Web Appendix).
In our final two studies (4a and 4b), we focused on the
equality mechanism using a moderation approach. To our
knowledge, the identification of the equality mechanism in this
context is novel. Indeed, the identification of the inequality
account broadens our understanding of perceptions of
inequality within society by moving beyond race, gender, and
nationality, among other factors.
Study 4: A Closer Look at the Inequality
Account
As suggested by social dominance theory, people differ in their
acceptance of ideologies that promote societal inequality and
social hierarchies (e.g., Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, and
Bobo 1994). Many individuals across a wide range of societies
support the idea that members of some dominant groups should
have access to the “good things” in life (e.g., higher education,
high income, good health care), whereas members of other
subordinate groups should not (Sidanius and Pratto 2011). This
difference depends on an individual’s social dominance orien-
tation preference for group-based hierarchy and inequality—
which in itself largely depends on how people were socialized
early in their lives (Duckitt 2001). While classical social dom-
inance theory suggests that social dominance is reflected in the
way people legitimize the dominance of specific social groups,
Sidanius et al. (2004) speculated that people’s support for
group-based inequality and dominance could also be reflected
in their support for institutions. It thus seems plausible that
people who are social dominance oriented are more accepting
and even supportive when “powerful institutions including
major financial organizations (e.g., banks, investment houses,
insurance companies) . . . allocate resources in ways that create
and maintain group dominance” (Sidanius et al. 2004, p. 851),
because such corporate behavior is consistent with their
ideology. People low in social dominance orientation, in con-
trast, should be more likely to endorse institutions that
“disproportionately allocate resources for the benefit of subor-
dinates—such as civil and human rights organizations, public
and private welfare agencies, and the public defender’s office,”
because these attenuate hierarchies and bring more equality to
the system (Sidanius et al. 2004, p. 851).
Therefore, we predict that consumer preference for crowd-
funded products will be attenuated when consumers are high in
social dominance orientation. Providing conceptual support for
the inequality account we identify (i.e., H2b), we expect that
consumers with a low general preference for social inequality
will be more inclined to reduce inequality in the marketplace,
which could be achieved through their purchase of crowd-
funded products. In contrast, consumers who are more inclined
to accept social inequality should be less concerned about a
democratic marketplace or reducing any power imbalance
therein; they should therefore be less likely to purchase crowd-
funded products. We test this prediction in Studies 4a and 4b by
measuring and manipulating consumers’ general preference for
inequality, and testing whether this preference moderates the
crowdfunding effect.
Study 4a
In Study 4a, we test whether the preference for crowdfunded
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Figure 2. The crowdfunding effect as a function of perceived risk
(Study 3).
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inequality. In line with prior research, we operationalize dif-
ferences in preference for social inequality by using social
dominance orientation. This is conceptualized as an
individual-level difference measure, representing preference
for group-based dominance hierarchies in which dominant
groups oppress subordinate groups (Ho et al. 2015; Jost et al.
2003; Pratto et al. 1994).
Method. Participants (N ¼ 305; Mage ¼ 35 years; 48% female;
MTurk) were exposed to two start-ups labeled Start-up A and
Start-up B; they were informed that both start-ups had recently
raised a comparable amount of funding to bring their product to
market but had differed in terms of funding source. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of our two funding source condi-
tions (funding source: Start-up A crowdfunded and Start-up B
venture capital funded, or vice versa). After being exposed to color
photos of two different cameras, they indicated their product pre-
ference on a seven-point item (1¼ “I would prefer to purchase the
product from Start-up A,” and 7¼ “I would prefer to purchase the
product from Start-up B”). In addition, participants were asked to
complete an eight-item social dominance orientation scale, which
was used to operationalize preference for social inequality (Pratto
et al. 1994; a ¼ .96). Example items included “An ideal society
requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom”
and “No one group should dominate in society” (1 ¼ “Strongly
oppose,” and 7 ¼ “Strongly favor”; for details, see the Web
Appendix). To avoid order effects, we administered the scale either
before product exposure or after the dependent variable.
Results and discussion. To test our predictions, we ran a hierarch-
ical regression analysis with product preference as the dependent
variable. Preference for social inequality measure, dummy-
coded funding source (0 ¼ Start-up A crowdfunded and Start-
up B venture capital funded, 1 ¼ Start-up B crowdfunded and
Start-up A venture capital funded), and the respective interaction
term (added as a second step) served as the independent vari-
ables. Results first revealed two significant main effects:
participants indicated a stronger preference for the product of
Start-up B (1) when it was described as crowdfunded (b ¼ .86,
SE ¼ .21, p < .001) and (2) when the participant scored higher
on social dominance (b ¼ .16, SE ¼ .11, p ¼ .05). Consistent
with our theorizing, the analysis further revealed a significant
interaction effect between funding source and preference for
social inequality (b ¼ .40, SE ¼ .16, p ¼ .012), indicating
that the preference for crowdfunded products is stronger with
participants who are less accepting of social inequality.6 Indeed,
a floodlight analysis using the Johnson–Neyman technique
(Hayes 2013) shows that the crowdfunding effect is significant
only for participants who scored low on the social dominance
orientation scale (i.e., lower than or equal to 3.32; these are 202
[out of 305] participants). However, for participants who scored
higher on social dominance orientation, the crowdfunding effect
was not significant (and, interestingly, was directionally nega-
tive; see Figure 3).
Study 4b
In Study 4b, we aim to extend the findings from Study 4a by
manipulating (rather than measuring) the focal moderator vari-
able to establish causality.
Method. Participants (N ¼ 406; Mage ¼ 36 years; 44% female;
MTurk) were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (funding
source: Start-up A crowdfunded and Start-up B venture capital
funded, or vice versa) 2 (acceptance of social inequality: high
vs. low) between-subjects experimental design. They were asked
to carefully read one of two different versions of an ostensible
New York Times article, designed to prime high versus low accep-
tance and support of social inequality. Specifically, in the high-
acceptance-of-social-inequality condition, participants read an
article about a new scientific endeavor that found positive effects
of social hierarchy for society. Participants in the low-acceptance-
of-social-inequality condition read the same article with one key
difference: in this version, the scientific endeavor reported the
negative effects of social hierarchy (for details, see the Web
Appendix). After reading the article, participants were asked to
summarize its main points, and their summaries were conse-
quently used as a reading check.7 Participants were then asked
to complete the same scale measuring social dominance orienta-
tion as employed in Study 4a, which served as a manipulation
check. Participants subsequently performed some filler tasks (i.e.,
identifying the part that stands out the most in a series of pictures
unrelated to the focal study). Next, in a purportedly unrelated
study, participants completed the same product preference study
as in Study 4a.
Results and discussion. The results of a 2  2 ANOVA on the
manipulation check measure (i.e., social dominance orienta-
tion scale) revealed that participants in the high-acceptance-
of-social-inequality condition scored significantly higher
(M ¼ 2.86) than those in the low-acceptance-of-social-
inequality condition (M ¼ 2.36; F(1, 334) ¼ 9.72, p ¼ .002,
d ¼ .34). Neither the main effect of the funding source nor the
two-way interaction were significant (ps > .20). These results
indicate that our manipulation was effective.8
6 Results remain robust if we add the order of measurement of participants’
social dominance orientation (before product exposure or after the dependent
variable) as an additional factor to the model; while the focal interaction
remains significant (b ¼ .41, SE ¼ .16, p ¼ .010), the order of
measurement did not affect it (b ¼ .28, SE ¼ .23, p ¼ .227).
7 Seventy-two participants failed this check. Participants who copy and pasted,
wrote completely irrelevant information, or did not mention anything related to
social hierarchy were excluded from further analysis. Thus, the final sample
consisted of 334 participants. We determined this screening criterion prior to
data collection.
8 Social dominance orientation scales are characterized by low grand means
and small variances. Across 14 studies in the seminal article of Pratto et al.
(1994), the grand mean of the scale was 2.74 and the average variance was .22.
Accordingly, it seems that relatively small differences in the scales (e.g.,
half-scale point) can discriminate between high and low levels of social
dominance orientation.
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A 2  2 ANOVA on product preference revealed a signif-
icant effect of the funding source factor: participants demon-
strated a significantly stronger preference for the product
of Start-up B when it was described as crowdfunded
(M ¼ 4.59) as opposed to venture capital funded (M ¼ 3.64;
F(1, 332) ¼ 20.77, p < .001, d ¼ .48). Whereas the impact of
the acceptance of social inequality factor on product preference
was not significant (F(1, 332) ¼ .75, p ¼ .39, d ¼ .07),
we found, most critically, a significant interaction effect
(F(1, 332) ¼ 5.79, p ¼ .017; see Figure 4). In line with our
theorizing, we found a positive and significant crowdfunding
effect in the low-acceptance-of-social-inequality condition
(Mstart-up B crowdfunded ¼ 4.75, Mstart-up B VC funded ¼ 3.26;
F(1, 332) ¼ 23.38, p < .001, d ¼ .77). However, this effect
was not significant in the high-acceptance-of-social-inequality
condition (Mstart-up B crowdfunded ¼ 4.42, Mstart-up B VC funded ¼
3.96; F(1, 332) ¼ 2.39, p ¼ .123, d ¼ .23).
By identifying a moderation effect, Studies 4a and 4b pro-
vide additional evidence that consumer motivation to help
reduce inequality is indeed a key mechanism underlying the
identified crowdfunding effect. Consistent with our theorizing,
consumers who are (or are primed to be) less accepting of
social inequality were more responsive to crowdfunded prod-
ucts; that is, these participants demonstrated a stronger prefer-
ence for the product when it was portrayed as crowdfunded. In
contrast, those who are (or are primed to be) more accepting of
social inequality did not show a heightened preference for
crowdfunded products.
General Discussion
More and more firms are turning to crowdfunding to overcome
one of their greatest challenges: accessing the financial capital
needed to bring their products to life (Mollick 2014). Research-
ers from diverse fields including finance, economics, entrepre-
neurship, information systems, and marketing have recently
shown a strong interest in understanding the dynamics of
crowdfunding. Most of this research considers crowdfunding
primarily as an online community that can be used as a funding
source. In this article, we take a different perspective by focus-
ing on the demand side of crowdfunding. That is, we address
how the knowledge that a product is crowdfunded influences
the behavior of observing, nonparticipating consumers. We
document that crowdfunding has an edge over alternative fund-
ing sources because of its psychological effects on consumers.
Our research provides a new perspective by combining finance
and marketing. Whereas funding decisions have been typically
viewed and assessed on the basis of financial and economic
considerations alone, this article shows that methods of financ-
ing have important marketing implications as well. If taken into
consideration, these implications could be leveraged for mar-
keting purposes and significantly impact consumer support for
the brand.
Theoretical Contributions
Our work offers several important contributions to the litera-
ture. First and foremost, we provide causal evidence for a pos-
itive crowdfunding effect: observing, nonparticipating
consumers demonstrate a greater preference, higher WTP (eli-
cited in an incentive-compatible fashion), and stronger pur-
chase intentions for crowdfunded products over products that
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Figure 3. The crowdfunding effect as a function of one’s preference
for social inequality (Studies 4a and 4b).
aHigh and low levels for acceptance of social inequality indicate the
values at +1 SD from the mean, respectively.
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noteworthy that the focal crowdfunding effect can be observed
when objective product characteristics are kept constant. Our
studies span a wide range of different product categories and
samples, highlighting the robustness and relevance of the focal
effect (Studies 1a1c).
Second, we find support for our proposed dual-process
framework: consumer preference for crowdfunded products is
driven by (1) product quality inferences—consumers use the
crowdfunded cue to make inferences regarding product quality,
and (2) inequality inferences—consumers believe that purchas-
ing crowdfunded products helps reduce inequality in the mar-
ketplace (Study 2).
Third, we introduce a novel and important boundary con-
dition that moderates consumer preference for crowdfunded
products. We document that the positive crowdfunding effect
is reversed for products that are associated with high risk
(Study 3). Specifically, we show that the positive quality
inference observed for lower-risk products reverses in a
high-product-risk context. We opine that this reversal is dri-
ven by a preference for signals from knowledgeable
professionals (as opposed to mainstream consumers) in these
high-risk product domains. This moderator variable may help
reconcile the often polarized views regarding the value of
crowdfunding identified in the marketing and innovation lit-
erature (e.g., Blaseg, Cumming, and Koetter 2020; Mollick
and Kuppuswamy 2014).
Fourth, we find that consumers believe supporting the con-
cept of crowdfunding by buying crowdfunded products
reduces inequality in the marketplace. Reinforcing this
insight, we find that the focal crowdfunding effect is stronger
among consumers who are fundamentally against social
inequality (Study 4a) or who are experimentally primed to
be so (Study 4b). These findings not only advance our under-
standing of crowdfunding but also contribute to research on
inequality which has previously focused predominantly on
social and economic inequality (e.g., Jost 2006; Norton and
Ariely 2011; Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom 2017). We argue
and demonstrate empirically that the concept of inequality can
extend to the marketplace and affect consumer preferences.
Thus, our work introduces the concept of marketplace
inequality in understanding consumer product preference,
which we believe is of interest to both marketing academics
and practitioners.
In parallel, our research also advances social dominance
theory, which has been primarily used to understand various
forms of discrimination or oppression in society (Sidanius and
Pratto 2011). We contribute to social dominance theory by
empirically documenting that people’s preference for hierar-
chies and social inequality refers not only to social groups but
also to marketplace institutions, and that such inequality con-
cerns affect consumption decisions. Prior research has shown
that social dominance orientation can predict beliefs, atti-
tudes, and lifestyle choices (Ho et al. 2015; Pratto et al.
1994), but research on how social dominance orientation
affects consumption decisions has been scarce and mostly
correlational in nature (for an exception, see Ordabayeva and
Fernandes [2018]; for an overview, see Jung and Mittal
[2020]). We contribute to this line of research by document-
ing causal evidence as to how differences in consumers’
social dominance orientation can affect consumer preference
for products that are associated with democracy and equality
(i.e., crowdfunding).
In addition to implications for social dominance theory,
which focuses on perceptions at the societal level, our findings
also have implications for the literature on fair market ideology
and market efficiency. In contrast to the common assumption
that most people consider the economic system highly legiti-
mate and fair (Jost et al. 2003), our findings point to consumer
discontent with market function. The findings also suggest that
instead of engaging in system justifying tendencies (Jost and
Hunyady 2005), consumers are driven to act—“correcting” the
difference in terms of their estimation of the market and opi-
nions as to how it should be. One explanation for this diver-
gence could be the increasing prevalence of inequality over the
past few decades (Piketty and Saez 2014; Ravallion 2014).
Indeed, policy makers and academics have named inequality
as one of the defining societal challenges of our age (Hauser
and Norton 2017; Starmans, Sheskin, and Bloom 2017)—a
view shared by the general public, as depicted in a report by
Pew (2014): Americans and Europeans consider inequality to
be the greatest threat to the world, even more so than some of
the major challenges faced by humanity today, such as fatal
diseases and climate change.
Finally, our research offers a new perspective on the under-
dog literature by introducing the idea of crowdfunding as a
signal of underdog status. For marketers, communicating that
a brand is crowdfunded might be a more subtle and unique way
to indicate a brand’s underdog status—and thus gain support
from consumers—compared with other strategies for convey-
ing brand origin (Paharia, Avery, and Keinan 2014).
Crowdfunding Versus Alternative Crowd-Based Models
While some of the product-related inferences we identified are
unique to crowdfunding, others seem to also emerge with other
crowd-based models. For example, research has shown that
consumers believe crowdsourced products (i.e., new products
based on user ideas) are more innovative and address their
needs more effectively (Nishikawa et al. 2017; Schreier, Fuchs,
and Dahl 2012). However, it has also been shown that the
positive downstream effects of crowdsourcing observed among
nonparticipating consumers hold only for relatively simple
products. If the underlying task or product category is per-
ceived as more complex, the focal effects are attenuated or
even reversed (Schreier, Fuchs, and Dahl 2012; for additional
moderators, see also Paharia and Swaminathan [2019] and
Thompson and Malaviya [2013]). This may not necessarily
be the case with crowdfunding, however. Indeed, the product
categories tested herein are relatively technically advanced
(e.g., digital notebook, digital camera). To more explicitly
address whether the crowdfunding effect documented in this
research is appreciably persistent in this regard, we conducted a
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follow-up study (N ¼ 242, MTurk) wherein we experimentally
contrasted the crowdfunding effect with a potential crowdsour-
cing effect in the context of a fairly technical consumer prod-
uct: technical diving gear. Findings indeed revealed that in this
product context, the crowdfunding effect is significantly stron-
ger than the comparative crowdsourcing effect (for details, see
the Web Appendix). Against this background, we conclude
that, at least for products that are not considered high risk,
crowdfunding might overcome some of the established caveats
of alternative crowd-based models such as crowdsourcing.
Our research might also be relevant for understanding
crowd-based phenomena beyond the crowdfunding realm; for
instance, our findings could shed light on the recent GameStop
phenomenon, in which a crowd of “mainstream” consumers
invested in a video game retailer that was under attack from
short-selling hedge funds (see, e.g., Ortutay and O’Brien 2021).
Beyond the economic considerations involved, it is possible
that ideological considerations—such as the aim to support a
falling underdog or increase inequality in the marketplace, as
observed in our study—could have motivated consumers’
GameStop investment behavior. Our research might offer a
starting point for understanding this and related crowd-based
phenomena in the domain of finance.
Substantive Implications
From a substantive standpoint, our findings are valuable to
firms that rely on crowdfunding to introduce their products as
well as to retailers that sell crowdfunded products. The insights
generated here suggest that marketing a product as crowd-
funded might positively impact both start-up and retailers’ bot-
tom lines. We therefore encourage such firms to proactively
communicate to the broader consumer market that the crowd
has been involved in funding their product. Some retailers seem
to be aware of this potential benefit. For example, Amazon
recently opened a Kickstarter product category, grouping and
explicitly marketing all relevant products as crowdfunded to
the general public (“Made on Kickstarter: Shop a wide range of
Kickstarter projects backed by a passionate community”).
However, we observe that many start-ups and retailers are not
yet leveraging this angle and thus fail to harness the full mar-
keting potential of crowdfunding. They could, for example,
label their product packages, websites, and promotional mate-
rials to clearly and prominently convey the crowdfunding
aspect. The caveat to these recommendations, however, is that
the underlying product should not be characterized by high
risk. In this situation, it might be preferable to downplay a
product’s crowdfunding history because the positive crowd-
funding effect could reverse and cause a backfire effect on
consumer demand.
Our insights regarding the effect’s underlying process pro-
vide further value to marketing communication experts (e.g.,
the two identified inferences might be leveraged proactively by
marketers). Should the target customer score high on social
dominance orientation, our findings could provide a warning
signal to marketers of crowdfunded products. In addition, our
findings inform entrepreneurs’ decision making when it comes
to funding their ventures. Although entrepreneurs may have
reason to seek alternative sources (e.g., venture capital funding
might provide valuable guidance that can contribute to growth)
(Drover et al. 2017), crowdfunding has an edge over said alter-
natives thanks to its psychological impact on the demand side
of the market (i.e., potential future customers). Therefore, if an
alternative funding source’s input is limited to financial con-
tribution, entrepreneurs might consider choosing crowdfunding
to finance their ventures.
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Apart from consumers’ social dominance orientation, there
might be other, related individual characteristics that could
predict consumer preference for crowdfunded products. For
example, consumers with authoritarian tendencies—people
who tend to oppress subordinate people (e.g., Eckhardt 1991;
Sidanius et al. 2004)—may dislike crowdfunded products. In
turn, it is also possible that consumers who tend to reject the
establishment, system, authority, or mainstream culture might
prefer crowdfunded products (Warren and Campbell 2014).
Perceptions regarding the marketplace might also impact the
strength of the crowdfunding effect; consumers who view the
marketplace as fair and efficient (Chernev and Carpenter 2001;
Jost et al. 2003) might be less inclined to choose crowdfunded
products. Thus, further research is needed to more fully under-
stand the impact of consumer characteristics and marketplace
perceptions on preferences for crowdfunded products. In a sim-
ilar vein, it seems promising to study contextual factors that
may influence consumer preference for crowdfunded products.
For example, scholars have identified several external factors
that influence the perception of inequality as justified and, in
turn, shape support for redistributive policies to reduce inequal-
ity (e.g., Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2015; Chow and Galak 2012;
Ordabayeva 2019; Ordabayeva and Fernandes 2017). Conse-
quently, factors impacting justness of marketplace inequality
could also influence preference for crowdfunded products.
Our research has established that the perceived risk asso-
ciated with the underlying product is an important boundary
condition. Other moderators with potential for future research
include the competitive situation in the market, the resource
mix required for production, or the firm size and history.
For example, would consumers react similarly to a
“crowdfunded” product if they learned that the underlying
firm was a start-up (which received its chance via crowdfund-
ing) versus an established firm that obtained financing for the
underlying product via crowdfunding? Relatedly, how do
consumers react to future products of the firm that are subse-
quently internally funded? That is, to what extent do consu-
mers form inferences about the product versus the firm?
Future research might also extend our investigation (focused
on business-to-consumer markets) to industrial buyers oper-
ating in business-to-business markets. Would they react simi-
larly? In this regard, it would be important to obtain additional
insights on how and when to emphasize a product’s
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crowdfunding narrative, and for whom (e.g., for which target
segments would such a cue be most effective)? Moreover,
future research could also examine whether small contribu-
tions from a large crowd of backers generates a more powerful
effect than large contributions from a small crowd of backers
(see, e.g., Fan, Gao, and Steinhart 2020).
Furthermore, our research examined only reward-based
crowdfunding, where crowdfunding participants receive an
underlying product in return for their financial support. What
happens to our focal crowdfunding effect if the incentives for
crowdfunding participants change? Would our effect simi-
larly hold if consumers participating in the crowdfunding of
a given venture received formal equity stakes—as is the case
with equity-based crowdfunding (Mollick 2014)? An initial
exploration of this question (for details, see the Web Appen-
dix) suggests that the crowdfunding effect does not signifi-
cantly differ as a function of the crowdfunding format.
Nonetheless, we encourage future researchers to further
explore if, when, and how different types of crowdfunding
might affect the magnitude of the crowdfunding effect
reported in this research.
Finally, future research might also delve into questions sur-
rounding the specificity of the crowdfunding context. Ques-
tions could include the following: Does the crowdfunding
effect depend on the number and type of people involved in
the crowdfunding? What role does the desired brand personal-
ity or positioning play in that space? For example, would the
crowdfunding effect similarly emerge for luxury products or
prestige brands targeted to the upper class? Answers to these
and related questions might help provide a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the crowdfunding phenomenon in gen-
eral, and the crowdfunding effect documented in this research
in particular.
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